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From September 2013 to February 2014 I led a project 
on ‘Caste in Britain’ for the UK Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC).* It culminated in two 
research reports.1 The remit of the project was, first, 
to review existing socio-legal research on British 
equality law and caste, and, second, to conduct two 
supporting events with the aim of bringing together 
interdisciplinary expertise and a range of stakeholder 
views on caste, and discrimination on the basis of 
caste, in the UK. In April 2013, MPs and peers had 
voted in both Houses of Parliament to enact the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill, Section 97 of 
which requires government to introduce a statutory 
prohibition of caste discrimination into British equal-
ity law by making caste an aspect of the protected 
characteristic of race in the Equality Act 2010 (EA 
2010).2 Following direction by the government, the 
EHRC contracted a team of academics from different 
universities, led by me, to carry out an independent 
study on caste in Britain. We set out to identify 
concerns and common ground in relation to the 
implementation of the statuary prohibition on caste 
discrimination in advance of and in anticipation of 
the required secondary legislation that will make 
caste ‘an aspect of race’ in the EA 2010.
The research for the project, particularly in ful-
filment of its second aim of garnering stakeholder 
views, was quite challenging due to the range of 
opinions and heightened sensitivities of both the 
pro-legislation and the anti-legislation organiza-
tions whom we brought face to face in a day-long 
workshop. It took all my skills as a philosopher 
(listening, arguing, clarifying, mediating, tracking 
truth and ensuring fairness) to generate an environ-
ment for a sustained exchange of views between 
divergent opinions – from the extreme right wing to 
the extreme left wing – interspersed with perspec-
tives of a medley of some very seasoned and other 
rather new campaigners, not versed in any definite 
political tendency, but pragmatically open to any 
party that supported their particular pro- or anti-
legislation stance.3 The political multi-logue enacted 
on the day was fed by many conversational streams 
and continues in various ways in different forums. 
Among the academic experts we invited the range 
of opinions was narrower than at the stake holders’ 
workshop; nonetheless, it included a comparable 
variety of positions of support for legislation on the 
one extreme and scepticism about the use of law on 
the other, inflected with varying degrees of political 
self-consciousness. 
The manner of inclusion of caste as an aspect of 
race in equality law is not yet settled; the outcome of 
continuing conversations between stakeholders is as 
yet unpredictable. In this article I will highlight some 
extralegal difficulties in mapping caste as an aspect 
of race and point out the pernicious role played by 
the ethos of multiculturalism in exacerbating these 
difficulties. Multiculturalism occludes the processes 
of becoming ‘different’, by naturalizing difference as 
pregiven. In the context of the experience of what I 
will call ‘casteism’ the effect of multiculturalism is 
to layer denial upon denial. To track truth in such 
circumstances requires attending to the exchanges 
between multiple ‘other’ voices
One such voice was an academic lawyer of Gujarati 
Indian background, teaching in a prestigious univer-
sity in the UK, who, by the time we invited him, had 
recorded, through his blogs, an opposition to the 
inclusion of caste in the EA 2010. 
Anti-castism and 
misplaced nativism
Mapping caste as an aspect of race
Meena dhanda
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He uses the framework of legal pluralism. The 
blogger writes:
When discussing caste and, more seriously, when 
legislating on it, a series of confusions occurs 
about what we are talking of and what we are 
aiming to do. The emotions stirred by the issue of 
caste, and a measure of self-righteousness, have a 
role to play in shaping the level of the discussion 
but, more critically, there is confusion as between 
Indian senses of caste and Western understandings 
of it. … When discussing caste, many Indians too 
speak as if they operate from within the Western 
framework.
Here is the charge of Orientalism against us. First, 
that we are imposing a Western frame on an Indian 
reality, which cannot be captured within it. Second, 
that caste is not what it appears to us, and we are 
mistaken in making it the object of legislation. And 
third, that we are ‘emotional’ rather than ‘critical’ 
about it. These charges are further built upon in 
subsequent posts four months after the publication 
of our reports in a long response signed by a number 
of Hindu organizations, including the Alliance of 
Hindu Organizations, Anti-Caste Legislation Com-
mittee, British Hindu Voice, City Hindus Network, 
Coalition for Dialogue, Hindu Lawyers Association, 
Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (UK), National Council 
of Hindu Temples (UK), National Hindu Students 
Forum (UK), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (UK), and Nitin 
Mehta.4 A snippet reads thus: 
The idea that Indian society is composed of a caste 
system is based on Christian representations of 
Indian society and culture, which were taken up 
by Orientalists and contemporary social scien-
tists who assumed their truth. The idea of a caste 
system was created because of the frustration of 
Christian missionaries who decided that Brahmins, 
who they typified as the ‘priests’ of the Hindu 
religion, were responsible for the failure of their 
efforts to convert Indians to Christianity. The idea 
of the caste system is therefore directly linked to 
Christian conversion efforts in India.5
Here a further accusation is added: that our alleged 
Orientalism is not only an epistemic drawback but 
is also suspicious for serving an imagined political 
purpose – that of furthering Christian conversion 
efforts in India. 
In October 2014, as the chair of Coalition for 
Dialogue, the same academic raises a scare about 
the implication of the proposed legislation for busi-
ness. Repeating the argument about the Orientalist 
construction of caste, he concludes:
Our assessment is that judges will be all too 
ready on the basis of alleged facts to assume that 
caste discrimination is made out. … Europeans 
invariably bring up the caste system when they 
are conversing with Indians. Judges, who are also 
educated within the same cultural milieu, will 
not be immune to such stereotyping. This effec-
tively lowers the applicable balance-of-probabilities 
standard of proof, and the burden of proof will be 
upon the South Asian employer, business, profes-
sional, other service provider or senior employee 
to defend themselves against what will effectively 
be a [sic] that caste discrimination has occurred. 
This exposes South Asians and their businesses to 
further discrimination in the operation of the law 
and … disadvantages them in being able to insure 
against caste-based claims.6
In the last blog entry, the fear of racism emerges with 
full force. Judges too, it is feared, will be unable to 
escape an Orientalist mindset that sees a problem in 
a benign social identity. In sum, as report writers, we 
are being accused of exposing South Asian businesses 
to a new possibility for racist stereotyping, should 
the government follow our recommendation in the 
manner of instituting the statutory secondary legis-
lation to make caste an aspect of race in the EA 2010.
Is this charge of Orientalism defensible? The first 
part of this article will address this question through 
a brief historical exploration of the caste system and 
of opposition to it. It is followed, in the second part, 
by the examination of a connected question: if caste 
is an indeterminate concept, does it follow that legis-
lation against caste discrimination is not defensible?
The bugbear of orientalism 
and precolonial caste
The problem I want to raise here is not about the 
general state of philosophy and how we have unques-
tionably failed to bring colour to our curriculum. 
It is rather about the dangers of misunderstanding 
that we, the excluded people of colour, face when 
we raise our critical voices. We point out the ways in 
which our ‘communities’ are divided by differences 
that ought to be removed, but we end up bringing 
those differences into sharper relief, and introduce 
greater fissures than existed before. Mainstream cur-
ricula can be enlarged by adding mainstream ‘others’ 
or by adding ‘others’ among those ‘others’. Perhaps 
this tension is how it should be. There can be no 
cosmetic solution to the inclusion of cultures with 
deep-rooted divisions within them, not least because 
of the slipperiness of the ‘cultures’ within which 
differences get manifested: ‘Culture alive is always on 
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the run, always changeful’, as Spivak writes. Cosmetic 
solutions of the multiculturalist variety, accommo-
dating differences through so-called ‘dialogue’, are 
also complicated when deeper interests are served 
by keeping some differences in place. As students 
of ‘cultural politics’ we can join Spivak in asking: 
‘In what interest are differences defined?’7 Such a 
question should take us to another level, beyond 
individual intentional behaviour correctible through 
personal appeals. 
Attempting to unmask the many faces of prejudice 
using the available resources within our discipline 
finds the vocabulary insufficient, the concepts 
missing. Even so, I will try to answer the first ques-
tion that the blogger’s attack generates. Put in a 
different way: am I being an Orientalist in using 
the vocabulary of ‘caste’ to name the experiences of 
humiliation, prejudice and discrimination that many 
of my Dalit respondents report? 
There are competing intellectual histories of the 
idea of ‘caste’, which has been compared to ‘race’ in 
different ways. I will briefly outline these histories 
and consider a conceptual comparison of ‘caste’ and 
‘caste identity’ with ‘race’ and ‘race identity’. I shall 
leave aside the legal elements of the comparison, and 
instead focus on the phenomenology of caste devel-
oped through my ethnographic research over the last 
eight years, and offer further suggestions towards 
the conceptual understanding of caste identity that 
I haltingly began in 1993.8 In this undertaking I find 
a fellow traveller in the person of Uma Narayan, 
professor of philosophy in the USA, whose refusal 
to take the ‘emissary position’ in Western con-
texts is both astute and brave. She knows full well 
that her feminist writings critical of Indian social 
practices can ‘be represented as anti-nationalist or 
anticommunity betrayals that collude with negative 
“Western views” about Third-World contexts’.9 Yet, 
fully armed with her critical insights, she fights 
the uncritical nationalist’s reprimands on the one 
hand and the Western feminist’s ‘condescending 
form of moral paternalism’ on the other. Western 
feminists, sensitized to the erasure of ‘Otherness’, 
in their sisterly concern warn her that she might 
‘reinforce Western stereotypes about Indian culture’ 
in her manner of revealing uncomfortable truths 
about the undeniable presence of misogynistic 
social practices within Indian culture. The western 
feminists’ advocacy of caution doubly excludes the 
excluded – first by placing the excluded as ‘different’, 
then by restricting the excluded from opening up 
differences within ‘difference’.
The central pursuits of the discipline of phil-
osophy are largely dictated by the concerns of the 
privileged insiders. Our subject neglects taking up 
uncomfortable questions from the vantage point of 
the excluded. Philosophy as such is predominantly 
an upper-class (upper-caste) male discipline and the 
Western philosophical canon is white. Even as lip 
service is paid to the impression Eastern philoso-
phies may have made on some European thinkers (for 
example, Schopenhauer), what is taught in academic 
departments is a selection of texts by white Western 
philosophers. The learning and teaching of the 
subject is done without critical reflection on how 
our ways of thinking may have suffered as a result of 
such a restricted diet. As Charles Mills puts it: ‘Most 
Western philosophers have been white and have 
taken their racial standing for granted, not seeing 
how it enters into their identity and affects their 
relationship with the universe.’10 We could slightly 
modify this statement to say that ‘Most Indian phil-
osophers have been upper-caste and have taken their 
caste standing for granted, not seeing how it enters 
into their identity and affects their relationship with 
the universe.’ And this would not be an effect of 
Orientalism, but of Brahmanism, which Dr Bhimrao 
Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956) made it his life’s mission 
to dismantle. Ambedkar was uncompromising and 
scathing in his criticisms, with no superficial attempt 
to keep peace with those he criticized.
With a surname (Dhanda) found among Dalits 
and non-Dalits, my situation is one of complicated 
positionality – of complicity (through ‘upper-caste’ 
family privilege) and resistance (as anti-caste femi-
nist) inextricably coupled together. I assume that 
there is no ‘pure’ opposition possible to any system 
of oppression or marginalization. Orientalism is a 
real enemy, but the blogger misidentifies its location 
within anti-castism espoused by academics trained 
within ‘western frameworks’ of thought. And by 
making caste identity appear a benign phenomenon 
‘misunderstood’ by Orientalists his own stance is one 
of a misplaced ‘nativism’ that de facto reinforces the 
hierarchical status quo.
The blogger’s nativism, the clinging to an ‘Indian’ 
sense of caste occluded by a ‘Western’ sense, emerges 
from a sharp division between the West and the ‘rest’. 
Chetan Bhatt, in a different vein from Spivak, pro-
vides an intellectual historiography of the bifurcation 
between East and West initiated by Voltaire, taken 
forward by Herder through Hegel to Schopenhauer.11 
The blogger has adopted the East/West bifurcation 
but ignores the praise Western philosophers, accused 
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of Orientalism, reserved for the ‘immortalizing’ phi-
losophies of the East.12 That these philosophies are 
subject to thoroughgoing ethico-legal criticism by 
insiders, such as in the criticism made of the phil-
osophy of Hinduism by Ambedkar, is also conveni-
ently ignored.
A Dalit by birth, a scholarship student of John 
Dewey at Columbia, Ambedkar read Nietzsche and 
juxtaposed him to Manu, the lawgiver. He writes in 
Philosophy of Hinduism: 
Thus Spake Zarathustra is a new addition of Manu 
Smriti. If there is any difference between Manu and 
Nietzsche it lies in this. Nietzsche was genuinely 
interested in creating a new race of men which will 
be supermen as compared with the existing race 
of men. Manu on the other hand was interested in 
maintaining the privileges of a class who had come 
to arrogate to itself the claim of being supermen 
… Nietzsche’s supermen were supermen by reason 
of their worth, Manu’s supermen were supermen 
by reason of their birth. … Manu’s is a degraded 
and degenerate philosophy of superman as com-
pared with that of Nietzsche and therefore far 
more odious and loathsome than the philosophy of 
Nietzsche.13
Much can be cited from the Manusmriti that shows 
contempt towards labourers (the Shudra). But some 
Hindus, particularly followers of the Arya Samaj, 
a reformist sect from Northern India, would want 
to differ with Ambedkar on the centrality of this 
text in the lived experience of Hindus. The Indian 
philosopher and Statesman S. Radhakrishnan chose 
the Upaniṣads as the definitive texts containing the 
essence of Hinduism, with clear acceptance of the 
supremacy of the Brahmin (Brāhmaṇa), but allowing 
some questioning about who counts as a Brahmin. 
Vajrasūcika Upaniṣad, included in his compilation The 
Principal Upaniṣads, directly addresses the question 
thus: 
The Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya and 
the Śūdra are the four classes (castes). That the 
Brāhmaṇa is the chief among these classes is in 
accord with the Vedic texts and is affirmed by the 
Smrtis. In this connection there is a point worthy 
of investigation. Who is verily, the Brāhmaṇa? Is he 
the individual soul [kiṁ jivaḥ]? Is he the body [kiṁ 
dehaḥ]? Is he the class based on birth [kiṁ jātiḥ]? 
Is he the knowledge? Is he the deeds (previous, 
present or prospective)? Is he the performer of the 
rites?14
The remainder of the Vajrasūcika Upaniṣad gives 
reasons to answer each of the questions about the 
identity of the Brāhmaṇa in the negative – he is not 
the soul, not the body, not the birth-ascribed class, 
not holder of knowledge, not the performer of rites – 
and concludes that the Brāhmaṇa is only identifiable 
by his qualities. He must be
rid of the faults of desire, attachment, etc., and 
endowed with the qualities of tranquillity, etc., rid 
of the states of being, spite, greed, expectation, 
bewilderment, etc., with his mind unaffected by 
ostentation, self-sense and the like, he lives. He 
alone who is possessed of these qualities is the 
Brāhmaṇa. This is the view of the Vedic texts and 
tradition, ancient lore and history. The accomplish-
ment of the state of the Brāhmaṇa is otherwise 
impossible.15
Taking this idealized definition of a Brāhmaṇa, no 
one could be a Brāhmaṇa by birth, and most would 
fail the accomplishment test, which is supposedly 
open to anyone to aspire to. It is this interpretation 
that the deniers of the caste hierarchy in the Hindu 
tradition have in mind. Indeed Radhakrishnan com-
ments at the end of the text that ‘It is valuable to 
recall the teaching of this Upaniṣad which repudiates 
the system that consecrates inequalities and hardens 
contingent differences into inviolable divisions’.16 For 
Radhakrishnan the inequality between a Brāhmaṇa 
and a Śūdra as particular individuals is merely con-
tingent, which a ‘system’ converts into rigid divi-
sions. This leaves open the intellectual possibility of 
imagining away the systematic differences between 
the two, an appealing option for the deniers.
The first problem with this approach is that it does 
not place the Brāhmaṇa as a member of a group, with 
identifiable and exclusive symbols of group member-
ship, including privileged access to the language of 
ritual, place of residence, occupation and even codes 
of dress. If, as the anthropologist G.D. Berreman 
notes, ‘where group affiliation is relevant, individual 
attributes are irrelevant’,17 then the exit option pro-
vided by the Upaniṣhads of denying ritual status 
to a Brāhmaṇa who lacks the requisite accomplish-
ments of a true Brāhmaṇa is a chimera. The status 
ascription, tied as it is to group membership not to 
individual attributes, cannot be shaken by merely 
pointing out individual failings. However, if and 
when Brāhmaṇas were to decline in importance as 
a group, due to other reasons, then pointing out 
individual failings may work to dislodge the superior 
status accorded to an individual Brāhmaṇa by par-
ticipants in the system.
The second problem with the intellectualizing 
approach is that it is does not answer why ordi-
nary people, Hindus and non-Hindus alike, are not 
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impressed by the idealized definition of a Brāhmaṇa 
and continue to take the four Varnas as birth-
ascribed? The answer perhaps lies in the influence of 
other texts – Manusmriti (the Law Book of Manu) and 
Bhagwat Gita, a text that forms an undeniably central 
part in the daily incantations of many Hindus.
Ambedkar shows that the Bhagwat Gita incorpo-
rates Manusmriti’s division of society into four Varna 
(sections) underpinned by inequality: ‘Gita is Manu in 
a nutshell’. The Hindu deity Lord Krishna says in the 
Gita: ‘I myself have created the arrangement known 
as Chaturvarna (i.e. the fourfold division of society 
into four castes Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyaa and 
Shudras) assigning them different occupations in 
accordance with the native capacities … Gita. IV. 13’; 
‘There is bliss in following the occupation of one’s 
own varna, even if death were to result in performing 
it … Gita. III. 35.’18 Further, as Ambedkar argues, the 
Gita gave a new lease of life to Varna, which ‘would 
have otherwise petered away’, precisely by provid-
ing ‘a philosophical foundation to the Varna system 
by arguing that the Varna was based on the innate 
qualities of man’.19
M.K. Gandhi (1869–1948) spoke in favour of Varna, 
and thus entered into a bitter dispute with Ambed-
kar. For Gandhi, ‘hereditary occupation’ is ‘the soul of 
the caste system. … To change it is to create disorder.’ 
He wrote in his Gujrati journal: ‘The caste system 
is a natural order of society … I am opposed to all 
those who are out to destroy the caste system.’20 
In his Varnavyavastha Gandhi defends hereditary 
occupations thus: ‘The object of the Varna system is 
to prevent competition and class struggle and class 
war. I believe in the Varna system because it fixes 
the duties and occupations of persons’; ‘Varna means 
the determination of a man’s occupation before he 
is born’21 and also that ‘everyone shall follow as a 
matter of dharma – duty – the hereditary calling of 
his forefathers, in so far as it is not inconsistent with 
fundamental ethics.’22
Outside the Chaturvarna, there is a fifth category, 
the avarna, referred to by various terms – caṇdālā 
(‘outcastes’ in the Upaniṣads), Harijan (‘children of 
God’ by M.K. Gandhi), Schedule Castes and Sched-
ule Tribes (in the Indian Constitution) and dalit (in 
contemporary political discourse). The word ‘Dalit’ 
emerged as a political term of self-identification in 
the 1970s but may be regarded as offensive by some to 
whom it is applied because of the painful histories of 
subordination and humiliation that it recalls. ‘To call 
oneself Dalit, meaning “ground down”, “broken to 
pieces”, “crushed” is to convert a negative description 
into a confrontational identity.’23 
From Ambedkar’s critique of the Philosophy of 
Hinduism, we can identify one startling respect in 
which the impact of the Manusmriti is in evidence 
today in everyday ‘lived experience’. This is in the 
practice of naming a Hindu child. Ambedkar explains 
that Manu gives directions as to what the first and 
second parts of the temporal name of a Hindu should 
denote:
The second part of a Brahman’s name shall be a 
word implying happiness, of a Kshatriya’s a word 
implying protection; of a Vaishya’s a term expres-
sive of prosperity and of a Shudra’s an expression 
denoting service. Accordingly the Brahmans have 
Sharma (happiness) or Deva (god), the Kshtrayas 
have Raja (authority) or Verma (armour), the Vaish-
ayas have Gupta (gifts) or Datta (giver) and the 
Shudras have Das (service) for the second part of 
their names. As to the first part of their names … 
in the case of a Shudra, Manu says the first part of 
his name should denote something contemptible!!24
Attention to the names of South Asians can give 
one a fairly good idea of the ‘caste’ of the person.25 
However, given several other complicating factors in 
acquiring names – place of birth to feudal associations 
– there is of course no foolproof method of deducing 
the caste of a person from their name. Ambedkar’s 
point in drawing attention to the Manusmriti’s rec-
ommendation is to show how deeply ingrained its 
teachings are. The deniers of caste hierarchy may 
want to pull out a little-known Upaniṣad (cited above) 
for support, but we simply have to look at our naming 
practices to accept the veracity of Ambedkar’s claim 
that the Manusmriti has been influential in directing 
our lives.26 
A
m
bedkar’s belongings
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Returning to the charge that the British imposed 
a Western model for understanding the supposedly 
benign phenomena of caste affiliation, which was 
essentially fluid, we need to look at pre-colonial 
times. It is undeniable that some consolidation of 
“traditional” India took place under British rule, but, 
as the historian Nicholas Dirks succinctly states, ‘The 
assumption that the colonial state could manipulate 
and invent Indian tradition at will, creating a new 
form of caste and reconstituting the social, and that 
a study of its own writings and discourse is sufficient 
to argue such a case, is clearly inadequate and largely 
wrong.’27 The suggestion that caste was not invidi-
ous because in pre-colonial India it was in a sense 
eclectic is to betray one’s distance from the writ-
ings of indigenous reformers of medieval India, who 
forcefully enlighten us about the blight of caste.28 
Indeed there are many historical examples of pre-
colonial protests against caste. In the Introduction 
to a new edition of Ambedkar’s key text, Annihilation 
of Caste,29 Arundhati Roy lists some of these: ‘In the 
mid-twelfth century, the Veerashaivas led by Basave 
challenged caste in South India, and were crushed. 
From the fourteenth century onwards, the beloved 
Bhakti poet saints – Cokhamela, Ravidas, Kabir, 
Tukaram, Mira, Janabai – became and still remain 
the poets of the anticaste tradition.’30 She does not 
add the Sikh Gurus to this list. There are numerous 
lines in Shri Guru Granth Sahib (SGGS), the sacred text 
of the Sikhs, with clear challenges to caste hierarchy, 
and caste-induced pride/honour, jāṯ-paṯ. 31 
The limitation, though, is that these challenges do 
not grapple with the socio-political disabilities that 
stem from caste, but offer spiritual equality as an 
antidote to caste prejudice. This limitation of equal-
ity to the sacred realm renders the Sikh response 
to caste prejudice limited in its effect to this day. 
Within the sacred space of the Gurudwara, equality 
is preached but outside this space inequality returns 
with a vengeance. Our point in listing these medieval 
protests to caste, limited though they may be, is 
to establish that well before the British set foot in 
India caste divisions were challenged by revolution-
ary poets, saints and seers. Caste or Jati was never 
benign. It was felt as a burden to be overthrown. 
A precursor of Ambedkar, Jotiba Phule (1826–1890), 
decried the caste system as ‘the code of crude and 
inhuman laws to which we can find no parallel 
among other nations’.32 
This part of our pre-colonial history also shows 
that ideas of equality stirred the minds of Indians 
well before the colonial encounter and did not spring 
for the first time from Christian missionary activi-
ties. The blogger is mistaken in thinking otherwise. 
Indeed one could argue that these pre-existing ideas 
of equality, coupled with their incongruent socio-
economic realization, made the victims of castism 
receptive to the colonizers’ offer of legal equality 
in the latter period of colonization. The blogger’s 
nativism is misplaced for the further reason that he 
underestimates the cultural resources of the Indic 
civilization – whilst spawning inequality it also pro-
duced elements of an antidote. 
Caste continues to be seen as a birth-ascribed 
status, and, even though historical ties to occupa-
tions have loosened for those who accept the religious 
hierarchical order, caste is still connected to ritual 
purity/pollution. It combines elements of social class, 
hierarchy and privilege sustained by endogamy (mar-
rying restricted within a group). There is undoubt-
edly a fluidity in the way people follow caste-based 
prescriptions; some even give them up altogether, 
sometimes with grave personal costs. I have gathered 
some evidence of rebellious anti-caste liaisons in my 
recent work on runaway marriages in the Punjab.33 
Further, in the Indian context caste stratifications 
maybe regionally variable. Nonetheless, caste invari-
ably denotes constraints, and in the case of those in 
the lower sections it spells deprivation, atrocities, 
violence and discrimination. Caste divisions are tied 
to unequal access to valued resources. Humiliation of 
certain groups considered socially inferior is routine; 
even as rebellion grows against such treatment, it 
is often met with a violent response. Gopal Guru’s 
moving studies Humiliation and The Cracked Mirror 
argues forcefully that reflection on experience, rather 
than ungrounded abstraction, ought to be the basis 
of social scientific theorizing.34 
Caste as a confrontational identity, symbolized in 
the self-ascription of the term ‘Dalit’, is quite differ-
ent from non-Dalit caste identifications, supposedly 
from a non-confrontational and non-hierarchical 
perspective. This perspective on caste, viewing it as 
a harmless identity, has been recently suggested as a 
theoretical alternative35 to Louise Dumont’s structur-
alist understanding of caste as fundamentally about 
hierarchy. This new understanding has been criticized 
as the ‘culturalization of caste’, a phrase coined by 
Balmurli Natarajan, who perspicuously describes 
it as a ‘counter-revolution’ whereby the project of 
annihilation of caste is derailed, and caste identity 
is accommodated within a multicultural celebration 
of ‘difference’. The hidden politics of this counter- 
revolution is the normalization of the ‘pretension 
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that caste is not about antagonistic, exploitative or 
oppressive relations’36 which require politico-legal 
interventions. Ambedkar’s message that caste must 
be annihilated, by using legal means if necessary, 
has neither been heard nor heeded by these new 
defenders of caste identity in its purportedly non-
confrontational, celebratory mode.
conceptual indeterminacy  
and the phenomenology of caste
We can now ask our second question: if caste is an 
indeterminate concept, does it follow that legislation 
against caste discrimination is not defensible? The 
view we took in our research report was that we 
must pay attention to the manifestation of caste. Its 
‘meaning’ must be gleaned from how people expe-
rience caste. The point may now be developed as 
follows. Even if the meaning of caste is indeterminate 
– that is, even if it means one thing to one group and 
something else to another, if it is considered hurt-
inducing by some and joy-inducing by others – the 
concern of the law is with the behaviour that emerges 
from the beliefs about caste. If there are identifiable 
patterns of behaviour that spring from the belief 
‘as if ’ caste has the fixed meaning of superiority of 
some when compared to others, then it makes sense 
to address such casteist behaviour as a systematic 
expression of caste prejudice. Thus, even though 
caste is an indeterminate concept, legislation on the 
basis of caste is defensible.
Focusing on the experience of caste, in a pilot 
study on the conversion of Dalits to Buddhism and 
Christianity in Wolverhampton, I found that caste 
is felt as a permanent, deeply embedded cultural 
tradition and that conversion does not leave caste 
behind. Bitter, visceral and emotive language is 
used to describe caste: it is ‘a monster’, ‘a disease’; 
‘It sticks’. Among the converts, there is powerless-
ness in relation to caste: it is something ‘done to 
you’ that you are ‘lumbered with’.37 Dalits choose 
to convert, attempting to escape caste by adopting 
religious traditions doctrinally opposed to casteism, 
but in the eyes of the ‘upper-caste’ these converts 
remain ‘lower-caste’. Caste manifests in the educa-
tion sector in Britain, in bullying and name-calling;38 
it surfaces in religious practice in Gurdwaras, for 
example in the reluctance to allow Valmikis – a Dalit 
caste grouping who have collectively dropped their 
caste name to adopt a religious label as followers 
of sage Valmiki – ‘to distribute karah prashard’.39 It 
manifests in the workplace with the example of those 
from the ‘higher caste’ refusing to take orders from 
‘lower caste’ managers.40 Recent reported incidents of 
caste discrimination in the UK that emerged at the 
seminars I organized as a part of the Caste in Britain 
project included caste stereotyping used to undercut 
business, sexual harassment in the workplace, and the 
refusal of taxi service on finding out the caste status 
of passengers. Many of these examples41 suggest pat-
terns of behaviour that would become actionable 
under discrimination law, when caste is made an 
aspect of race. Research on recent Nepali migrants 
to Oxfordshire shows evidence of ‘active revival of 
caste’ manifest in ‘residential patterns’ bordering on 
Untouchability.42 Through marriage, education and 
networking, this cycle of new migrants continues to 
reproduce the pattern of ‘diasporal elites utilizing 
and profiting from an immigrant underclass’, sug-
gesting ‘a need to consider the range of experiences 
mediated by caste and gender as well as the potential 
for exploitation’.43 
If legislation against caste discrimination is thus 
defensible, what can we learn from a comparative 
perspective on race and caste? In a seminar in London 
in 1966 on Caste and Race: Comparative Approaches, 
it was noted that the caste system comprised ‘groups’, 
‘discrete, bounded, ranked entities’ and ‘a system 
of institutionalized inequality’;44 interestingly, the 
French structuralist Louise Dumont urged that the 
point of the comparative approach was to ‘redis-
cover hierarchy’ in order to throw light on ‘the dark 
corners of our own society’.45 For G.D. Berreman, 
caste systems are ‘always in disequilibrium, like pots 
of water on fire, always threatening to boil over. They 
are characterized not by consensus but by conform-
ity. They are maintained not by agreement but by 
sanctions.’46 This reiterates Ambedkar’s observation 
that ‘No one who knows anything about the Manu 
Smriti can say that the caste system is a natural 
system. What does Manu Smriti show? It shows that 
the caste system is a legal system maintained at the 
point of a bayonet.’47
Berreman criticizes the tendency among those 
who study and analyse caste systems to idealize or 
intellectualize caste. ‘Caste is people … interacting in 
characteristic ways … a caste system is a pattern of 
human relationships and it is a state of mind.’48 Most 
importantly, it was noted in a way that is still relevant 
today that even though there may be disequilibrium, 
the system persists through change. Regardless of the 
inconclusive theoretical debates on its meaning, caste 
continues to be vividly present in the experiential 
realm, sometimes just below the surface. This sug-
gests that it is through a phenomenology of caste that 
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we may be able to grasp its meaning. This chimes 
with the observations of the philosopher Sally Has-
langer, a white mother of two adopted black children. 
In Resisting Reality, Haslanger writes of racism: 
it is a mistake to suggest that the ultimate source 
of the problem is ‘in our heads’ (in our conceptual 
scheme, our language, or our cultural ideals), or 
alternatively that it is in the unjust structure of 
our social arrangements, as if it must be one or the 
other; ‘culture’ and ‘social/institutional structure’ 
are deeply intertwined, so much so, that they are 
sometimes inextricable.49 
And so it is with caste. As with racial identity, caste 
identity is also ‘largely habitual’ and ‘often ritual-
ized’, but, unlike racial identity, caste identity is not 
‘regularly unconscious’; it is rather quite overt. The 
difference, I think, emerges from what Ambedkar 
describes as a system of ‘graded inequalities’. With 
respect to each group there is someone lower and 
someone higher. In this situation, caste identity may 
not manifest itself in the presence of those with 
whom there is no direct competition, and in these 
cases it may remain ‘unconscious’; but in cases where 
the competition for resources is sharp, caste identity 
becomes overt. I agree with Haslanger that, because 
of our socialization as embodied subjects, ‘not just 
rational, cognitive agents’, caste identity – like race 
identity – is ‘training the body to feel, to see, to 
touch, to fear, to love’ in particular ways. Focus on 
‘the intentional is to miss the many ways that we 
unintentionally and unconsciously participate in 
racism and sexism’50 – and, I would add, ‘in casteism’.
However, any possible definition of ‘caste’ will be in 
one important respect different from Haslanger’s and 
other definitions of ‘race’, to the extent that the latter 
focus on visible marks of skin colour. The visibility 
of caste is not the visibility of skin colour but of the 
clothed body, the body in the space of action, meaning 
and vulnerability – where ‘being clothed’ includes 
wearing expressions as well as being dressed, project-
ing a voice, carrying the smell of clothes, body odours, 
being armed with the tools of the trade, marked or 
unmarked by scars, wrinkles and other signs of toil, 
age, exposure to the elements, displaying or hiding 
one’s possessions. In our clothed encounters, other 
bodies are first marked not by skin colour but by these 
identity markers that run ahead of us, as we approach 
each other. Our bodies reside within social spaces – it 
is the acting body that we see, or hear first of all, not 
a coloured, white, brown or black face. 
Our relationship to clothes – what they mean to us 
– is marked by caste, class and race. It is in this sense 
that caste is ‘visible’, when it is certainly not visible 
in terms of skin colour. We use social maps to orient 
ourselves in this saturated space, drawing inferences 
about people’s caste on the basis of our tacit knowl-
edge. In urban settings, people may not directly ask 
what someone’s caste is, but they ask searching ques-
tions about the inhabited space – Where do you live? 
What temple/gurdwara/church do you worship in? 
What do your parents do? Caste is deduced from the 
answers to these questions. 
This way of looking at caste identity has some 
similarity with Charles W. Mill’s account of race 
when he writes: 
Race [Caste] is not ‘metaphysical’ in the deep sense 
of being eternal, unchanging, necessary, part of 
the basic furniture of the universe. But race [caste] 
is a contingently deep reality that structures our 
particular social universe, having a social objec-
tivity and causal significance that arises out of 
our particular history. … Because people come to 
think of themselves as ‘raced’, as black and white 
[as Brahmin and non-Brahmin], for example, these 
categories, which correspond to no natural kinds, 
attain a social reality. Intersubjectivity creates a 
certain kind of objectivity.51 
Armed with the parallel between how race and 
caste are experienced, we can now turn to the remark 
of Lord Bhikhu Parekh on 22 April 2013 in the House 
of Lords, opposing the amendment to include caste 
as an aspect of race in the EA 2010:
Talking about abolishing the caste system is ex-
tremely problematic because it could mean getting 
rid of the category, getting rid of the hierarchy 
among the categories or getting rid of the princi-
ple of heredity which determines the caste. Where 
do you start? I suggest that caste as a category of 
discrimination is therefore not in the same league 
as race, religion or any of the other protected 
categories.52 
In one sense it is not surprising that Parekh should 
highlight the particularity of the category of ‘caste’, 
wanting to hold on to the identity-conferring role 
of caste, but denying that it could work in law as an 
identifiable basis of discrimination. At one level this 
is a continuation of the Gandhian project of saving in 
name an element of the Hindu tradition. For Gandhi 
it was Varna, for Parekh it is caste. For proponents of 
multiculturalism, misunderstanding a culture and its 
traditions is ironically the worst thing that can befall 
members of minority communities, worse even than 
allowing the continuation of discriminatory practices 
stemming from notions of superiority/inferiority 
intrinsically linked to caste identifications. 
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Parekh lists four ‘major difficulties’53 that stand in 
the way of attempts to make caste an aspect of race 
for the purposes of anti-discrimination legislation, 
but we have a reply to each of them. First, Parekh 
claims that ‘there will be frivolous complaints based 
on caste … Since every Indian who is Hindu carries 
the caste mark with him, every action that he does 
with respect to another can be subsumed under one 
or another form of caste discrimination.’ But car-
rying the ‘caste mark’ as a confrontational identity 
in the face of denigration is different from carrying 
it as uncritical mark of pride. The facts of the case 
would determine whether or not a claimant of the 
charge of discrimination could establish a pattern of 
behaviour that can be seen to manifest caste preju-
dice and discrimination. To imagine an eruption of 
frivolous complaints is merely scaremongering, not 
least because the cost of litigation is so high and the 
chances of success so low. 
Second, Parekh claims that ‘once you take away 
the untouchability bit, there is no evidence of any 
kind to show that caste discrimination takes place.’ 
But, on the contrary, there is sufficient evidence of 
discrimination to warrant the inclusion of caste in 
the EA 2010, as the research that I have cited shows. 
Third, Parekh asks ‘How do you define caste?’, 
implying, correctly, that this is no easy undertaking. 
But it is not necessary to have a definition of caste as 
such for the purposes of legislation, just as ‘race’ is 
left undefined in the EA 2010. 
Finally, Parekh claims that ‘A category as inde-
terminate as that [of caste] does not deserve to be 
enshrined in domestic legislation.’ But all we need to 
identify caste discrimination is the ability to identify 
patterns of behaviour that would reasonably be seen 
as discrimination on the basis of caste by the victims 
of discrimination. What matters in not the meaning 
of the term ‘caste’ but the identification of the pattern 
of behaviour that can be identified as casteist. 
Parekh’s misgivings about the inclusion of caste in 
the EA 2010 mirror the ‘nativist’ concerns. These con-
cerns were anticipated by the chairperson of Caste-
Watch UK, Satpal Muman, in 2000 whilst actively 
lobbying for legislation against caste discrimination. 
He said:
One concern that I have is this: Asians are already 
victims of racism in Britain. There may be a 
curious affect caused whereby the indigenous 
community may use the Caste divisions amongst 
the Asians as a weapon of further oppression. The 
Asians could be accused of in-fighting and those 
Asians who are fighting against Racism itself may 
see their work being undermined by our outcry 
against Caste. Some thought ought to be given 
to this as to how best we can achieve our goals 
notwithstanding the fact there will certainly be a 
backlash at least from the conservative elements of 
the Indian community for placing Caste System in 
the public domain. The Right wing Fascists could 
also use this to further their aims.54 
Muman was right to anticipate opposition from 
‘the conservative elements in the Indian commu-
nity’. Just prior to the May 2015 general election, the 
National Council of Hindu Temples UK, the Hindu 
Forum of Britain and the British Sikh Consultative 
Forum each issued a letter, urging voters to use their 
vote to defeat parties supporting the legislation on 
caste in the UK.55 (The NCHTUK is now accused of 
flouting Charity Commission guidelines in issuing 
electoral support for the Conservative Party.56) But 
the ‘backlash’ Muman feared has also materialized in 
a more disturbing form than he might have imagined. 
The most recent statement of the deniers of caste 
reads:
For the avoidance of doubt, we re-iterate that the 
fluid and equitable, Dharmic non-hereditary, non-
endogamous social structures which are repeatedly 
detailed in Hindu, Sikh and Jain scriptures, in no 
way match the Caste system which was created 
by the despotic medieval Popes in Europe, then 
exported by colonial missionaries to the Empire.57
As the muddled spectre of Orientalism thus rises 
again it is worth reminding ourselves of Edward 
Said’s claim that the ‘disadvantaged postcolonial 
states and their loyalist intellectuals’ have drawn 
the wrong conclusion if they ‘attempt to improve, 
enhance, and ameliorate the images currently in 
circulation without doing anything to change the 
political situation from which they emanate’.58 The 
legislation on caste discrimination is precisely an 
attempt to ‘do something’ to change the situation 
which generates the unflattering ‘image’ feared by 
the deniers, following Said’s recommendation that 
a reflective and critical ‘decentred consciousness’ 
should generate ‘political and practical’ activities 
that are ‘marginal, and oppositional with reference 
to the mainstream’.59
If we want to move away from the ‘treacly pieties’ 
of multiculturalism60 and its mindless celebration of 
branded ‘difference’ we will need to reinvigorate the 
‘critical spirit’ appropriate to philosophical engage-
ment with disturbing questions that seek to name, 
to understand and to find ways of eliminating the 
experience of unjustified discrimination.
42
notes
  1. Meena Dhanda et al., Caste in Britain: Socio-Legal Review, 
Research Report 91, Equality and Human Rights Com-
mission, UK, Manchester, 2014. First published online 28 
February 2014, www.equalityhumanrights.com/publica-
tion/research-report-91-caste-britain-socio-legal-review. 
Meena Dhanda et al., Caste in Britain: Experts’ Seminar and 
Stakeholders’ Workshop, Research Report 92, Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, UK, Manchester, 2014. First 
published online 28 February 2014, www.equalityhuman-
rights.com/publication/research-report-92-caste-britain-
experts-seminar-and-stakeholders-workshop.
 2. For a detailed background of the inclusion of caste in the 
Equality Act 2010, see Annapurna Waughray, ‘Capturing 
Caste in Law: Caste Discrimination and the Equality 
Act 2010’, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 14, no. 2, 2014, 
pp. 359–79; first published online 13 May 2014. See also 
Waughray, ‘Caste Discrimination: A Twenty-First Century 
Challenge for UK Discrimination Law?’, Modern Law Review, 
vol. 72, no. 2, 2009, pp. 182–219, the first article to discuss 
the legal recognition of caste as a ground for discrimination 
in UK law.
 3. Of the 60 organizations invited, 43 sent representatives to 
the stakeholders’ workshop in London on 9 November 2013. 
For details of the participating organizations, see Dhanda 
et al., EHRC Research Report 92.
 4. Several of these organizations were invited and partici-
pated in our EHRC project workshop for stakeholders.
 5. ‘Response to Two Reports on Caste published by the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission’, posted on 25 
June 2014, https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2014/06/25/
response-to-two-reports-on-caste-by-the-equality-and-
human-rights-commission; accessed 26 March 2015.
 6. ‘UK Caste Discrimination Legislation: Implications for 
Business and Employers’, posted on 9 October 2014, para 
17, https://aryalegal.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/uk-caste-
discrimination-legislation-implications-for-business-and-
employers; accessed 26 March 2015.
 7. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial 
Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA, 1999, p. 357.
 8. In 1993, I noted the limitations of the application of Kant’s 
notion of respect to people negotiating with the power-
ful within a hierarchical setting of graded inequalities 
underpinned by caste identities. At the time when the 
first translations of ancient Indian scriptures were being 
undertaken, Kant wrote: ‘Preferential tributes of respect in 
words and manners even to those who have no civil author-
ity – reverences, obeisances (compliments), and courtly 
phrases marking with utmost precision every distinction in 
rank, … a pedantry in which the Germans seem to outdo 
any other people in the world (except possibly the Indian 
castes): Does not all this prove that there is a wide spread 
propensity to servility in men? … But one who makes him-
self a worm cannot complain afterwards if people step on 
him.’ See Immanuel Kant The Metaphysics of Morals, intro., 
trans. and notes by Mary Gregor, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 232. Kant’s harshness towards 
those constrained to perform utterances marking respect 
for rank is striking when applied to Dalits. See Meena 
Dhanda, ‘L’éveil des intouchables en Inde’, trans. Isabelle di 
Natale, in Catherine Audard, ed., Le respect: De l’estime à la 
déférence: une question de limite, Éditions Autrement, Paris, 
Série Morales No. 10, February 1993, pp. 130–45.
 9. Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and 
Third World Feminism, Routledge, New York and London, 
1997, p. 136.
 10. Charles Mills, Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and 
Race, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY and London, 1998, 
p. 66.
 11. Chetan Bhatt, ‘Primordial Being: Enlightenment and the 
Indian Subject of Postcolonial Theory’, in Peter Osborne 
and Stella Sandford, eds, Philosophies of Race and Ethnicity, 
Continuum, London and New York, 2002, pp. 40–62.
 12. Kojin Karatani observes: ‘Looking down on the other as 
an object of scientific analysis and looking up to the other 
as an aesthetic idol are less contradictory than complicit.’ 
‘Uses of Aesthetics: After Orientalism’, boundary 2, vol. 25, 
no. 2, 1998, p. 147. I am grateful to Alexei Penzin for drawing 
my attention to Karatani.
 13. B.R. Ambedkar, Philosophy of Hinduism, Critical Quest, 
New Delhi, 2010, pp. 32–3.
 14. S. Radhkrishnan The Principal Upaniṣads, HarperCollins 
India, Noida, 2014 (1953), p. 935. I have added the square 
brackets to insert the transliterated Sanskrit text from the 
paragraph preceding the translation cited from p. 935.
 15. Ibid., pp. 937–8.
 16. Ibid., p. 938.
 17. Gerald D. Berreman, ‘Stratification, Pluralism and Interac-
tion: A Comparative Analysis of Caste’, in Anthony de 
Reuck and Julie Knight, eds, Caste and Race: Comparative 
Approaches, J. & A. Churchill, London, 1967, p. 48.
 18. Ambedkar, Philosophy of Hinduism, pp. 70, 69–70.
 19. Ambedkar, ‘Gandhism’, in Valerian Rodrigues, ed., The 
Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar, Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi, 2002, p. 164.
 20. Gandhi, Nava-Jivan, 1921–2, cited in Ambedkar, The Essential 
Writings of B.R. Ambedkar, pp, 151, 151–2.
 21. Gandhi, cited in ibid., p. 153.
 22. See Gandhi’s ‘Introduction to Varnavyavastha’, Harijan-
bandhu, 23 September 1934, in The Moral and Political 
Writings of Mahatama Gandhi, Vol. 3, ed. R. Iyer, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1987, pp. 559–65. I have discussed Gandhi’s 
views on Varna in Dhanda, ‘L’éveil des intouchables en 
Inde’, and in The Negotiation of Personal Identity, VDM 
Verlag Dr Müller, Saarbrücken, 2008.
 23. Anupama Rao, The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of 
Modern India, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2009, 
p. 1.
 24. Ambedkar, Philosophy of Hinduism, pp. 32–3.
 25. I recall attending a philosophy conference some thirty 
years ago in India in which a Bengali professor asked me my 
family name and that of a female colleague accompanying 
me. He was puzzled by my name, but it took him just a few 
minutes to determine that my colleague was one of the 
twelve highest castes of Brahmins, and in even less time 
he switched attention to her to compare notes about their 
Brahmin lineage. 
 26. Anticipating objections to his making the Manusmriti 
rather than the Upaniṣads into the key text that defines 
the philosophy of Hindus, and enlisting the support of the 
revolutionary and rationalist Lala Hardyal – ‘The treatises 
are full of absurd conceits, quaint fancies, and chaotic 
speculations’ (Cited in Ambedkar, Philosophy of Hinduism, 
p. 74) – to downplay the relevance of the Upaniṣads for the 
lived experience of Hindus, Ambedkar concludes that the 
Upaniṣad philosophy ‘turned out to be most ineffective 
and inconsequential piece of speculation with no effect on 
the moral and social order of the Hindus.’ (Philosophy of 
Hinduism, p. 74).
 27. See ibid,., p. 74. Nicholas B. Dirks,. ‘Castes of Mind’, in 
Representations 37, Special Issue: Imperial Fantasies and 
Postcolonial Histories, Winter 1992, pp. 56–78. 
 28. Dhanda, ‘L’éveil des intouchables en Inde’.
 29. B.R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste, in The Essential 
Writings of B.R. Ambedkar, ed. Valerian Rodrigues, Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi, 2010 (1936), pp. 263–305.
 30. Arundhati Roy, ‘The Doctor and the Saint’, Introduction to 
B.R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste, Verso, London, 2014, 
p. 37.
 31. Guru Amar Das (SGGS 994) writes: 
  ਨਾ ਮ ੈ ਜਾਤ ਨ ਪਤਿ ਹ ਨਾ ਮ ੈ ਥ ੇਹ ਨ ਥਾਉ ॥ 
Nā mai jāṯ na paṯ hai nā mai thehu na thāo. 
I have no social status or honor; I have no place or home.
43
  ਸਬਦਿ ਭ ੇਦਿ ਭ ੍ਰਮ ੁ ਕਟਿਆ ਗ ਰੁਿ ਨਾਮ ਦ ੀਆ ਸਮਝਾਇ ॥੨॥ 
Sabaḏ bẖeḏ bẖaram katiā gur nām ḏīā samjẖāe. ||2|| 
Pierced through by the Word [of the Shabad], my doubts 
have been cut away. The Guru has inspired me to under-
stand the Naam, the Name of the Lord. ||2||
  Mahla 3, Guru Amar Das, www.srigranth.org. 
  To understand the rebellion against the degeneration of 
‘original anti-casteism of Sikh culture into merely a received 
glory’, see Pritam Singh and Meena Dhanda, ‘Sikh Culture 
and Punjābiyat’, in Oxford Handbook of Sikh Studies, ed. 
Pashaura Singh and Louis E. Fenech, Oxford University 
Press, New York, pp. 482–92. 
 32. Jotiba Phule, cited by Gail Omvedt, Dalit Visions, Orient 
Longman, New Delhi, 2006, pp. 17–18. 
 33. Meena Dhanda, ‘Runaway Marriages: A Silent Revolution?’, 
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XLVII, no. 43, 27 October 
2012, pp. 100–108.
 34. Gopal Guru, ed., Humiliation, Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi, 2012. See also Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai, The 
Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory, 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2012.
 35. Chiefly the alternative is offered by Dipankar Gupta: ‘castes 
are, first and foremost, discreet entities with deep pockets 
of ideological heritage. As they are discreet phenomenas 
[sic], it is both logically and empirically true that there 
should be multiple hierarchies as each caste always 
overvalues itself ’, and ‘no caste really thinks of itself to be 
inherently inferior to any other caste’. In ‘Caste and Politics: 
Identity over System’, Annual Review of Anthropology 34, 
2005, pp. 409–27; 412, 419. This conclusion celebrating 
caste identity seems to emerge from disproportionate at-
tention to the politics of upwardly mobile castes, and does 
not account for the continuing deprivation and relegation 
of most Dalits to the bottommost layers of society.
 36. Balmurli Natarajan, The Culturalization of Caste in India: 
Identity and Inequality in a Multicultural Age, Routledge, 
Abingdon and New York, 2012, p. 9.
 37. Meena Dhanda, ‘Eastern Punjabi Dalits: A Case Study of 
Wolverhampton’, paper presented jointly with Steve Taylor 
and Dave Morland, British Association of South Asian 
Studies annual conference, Edinburgh, 30 March–1 April 
2009. 
 38. See Paul Ghuman, British Untouchable: A Study of Dalit 
identity and Education, Ashgate, Farnham, 2011; Meena 
Dhanda, ‘Punjabi Dalit Youth: Social Dynamics of Transi-
tions in Identity’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 17, no. 1, 
March, 2009, pp. 47–63.
 39. See Eleanor Nesbitt, ‘Valmikis in Coventry: The Revival 
and Reconstruction of a Community’, in Roger Ballard, ed., 
Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain, C. Hurst 
London, 1994, pp. 117–41; 128.
 40. Meena Dhanda, ‘Certain Allegiances, Uncertain Identities: 
The Fraught Struggles of Dalits in Britain’, in Om Prakash 
Dwivedi, ed., Tracing the New Indian Diaspora, Editions 
Rodopi, New York, 2014, pp. 99–119.
 41. For more examples, see the government commissioned 
study, H. Metcalf and H. Rolfe, Caste Discrimination and 
Harassment in Great Britain, National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research, London, 2010.
 42. Mitra Pariyar, ‘Cast(e) in Bone: The Perpetuation of Social 
Hierarchy among Nepalis in Britain’, Working Paper No. 85, 
University of Oxford, 2011.
 43. Kaveri Qureshi et al., ‘Migration, Transnationalism and 
Ambivalence: The Punjab–United Kingdom Linkage’, in 
Pirkko Pitkänen, Ahmet Äçduygu and Deniz Sert, eds, 
Migration and Transformation: Multi-level Analysis of Migrant 
Transnationalism, International Perspectives on Migration, 
Dordrecht and London, 2012, p. 56.
 44. Berreman, ‘Stratification, Pluralism and Interaction’, p. 49.
 45. See Louise Dumont, ‘Caste: A Phenomenon of Social 
Structure or an aspect of Indian Culture?’, in de Reuck and 
Knight, eds, Caste and Race, p. 37.
 46. Berreman, ‘Stratification, Pluralism and Interaction’, p. 67.
 47. Ambedkar, The Essential Writings, p. 164.
 48. Berreman, ‘Stratification, Pluralism and Interaction’,  
p. 58.
 49. Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and 
Social Critique, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012, 
p. 277.
 50. Ibid., p. 285.
 51. Mills, Blackness Visible, p. 48, my parentheses.
 52. Lord Bhikhu Parekh, House of Lords Debates, Daily 
Hansard, 22 April 2013, column 1305, www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/130422-0003.
htm
 53. The four difficulties are listed in Parekh, ibid., Column 
1305-1306. Parekh concludes that ‘For these and other 
reasons I would be opposed to the amendment, while 
making it absolutely clear – so that I am understood outside 
this House – that untouchability exists. It is an abominable 
practice; people are sometimes discriminated against and 
the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, at a meet-
ing he organised, produced people who were able to give 
evidence. Take for instance a bus driver who happens to be 
a Brahmin or whatever, and there is a person who works on 
the buses who he would not want to team up with because 
the guy is supposed to have a surname that indicates he 
may be an untouchable. It exists in small pockets in those 
places where people are recognisable. It is not a pervasive 
phenomenon, but even if it is not pervasive, it is still not 
acceptable. The point is that it is only one extreme form of 
caste. By introducing caste as a general category in this way 
one is trying to catch too much and will end up catching 
too little.’
 54. Satpal Muman ‘Caste in Britain’, in Dalit Human Rights, 
Report of the proceedings of an International Conference, 
London 16–17 September 2000, organized by Voice of 
Dalit International (VODI) and Dalit Solidarity Network, 
published by VODI, on 10 October 2000, pp. 71–79, p. 73, 
www.ambedkar.org/Worldwide_Dalits/caste_in_britain.
htm. See also the Human Rights Watch 2001 report, 
Caste Discrimination: A Global Concern, www.hrw.org/
reports/2001/globalcaste/caste0801.pdf.
 55. In his letter, Satish K. Sharma, the general secretary of the 
NCHT (UK) wrote: ‘the Conservative Party is the only party 
which has consistently listened to us and voted against the 
legislation and whose members are committed to repealing 
the Caste amendment if re-elected.’ www.nchtuk.org; 
accessed 4 May 2015. The letter was removed from the 
website following announcement of a Charity Commission 
investigation.
 56. See Siraj Datoo, ‘Hindu Charity Investigated over Open 
Letter Endorsing the Conservatives’, 5t May 2015. See www.
buzzfeed.com/sirajdatoo/hindu-charity-investigated-over-
open-letter-endorsing-the-co; accessed 15 May 2015.
 57. Sharma letter; see n55.
 58. See Edward Said, ‘Orientalism Reconsidered’, Cultural 
Critique 1, Autumn 1985, pp. 89–107; 100. 
 59. Ibid., pp. 105–6.
 60. Gopal Balakrishnan, Antagonistics: Capitalism and Power 
in an Age of War, Verso, London and New York, 2009, 
p. 250. The phrase is from a review of Bhikhu Parekh’s 
book Rethinking Multiculturalism, and where he, Parekh, is 
described as an ‘eminently establishment figure’ (p. 246) 
who has offered ‘the de-Westernization of liberalism – a 
stealth liberalism’ (p. 248).
